The Continuing Deception Over the Douma Alleged Chemical Weapons Attack

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon (OPCW) 2023 IIT Report on the 2018 Alleged Chemical Weapons Attack in Douma, Syria.

Author’s Note: To date, significant procedural and scientific flaws have been identified and confirmed with respect to the OPCW’s investigation of the alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma, Syria, on the 7th of April 2018. These issues are set out in full in the Berlin Group 21 Review and can be read here. This article provides an accessible and referenced summary of some of the key scientific flaws, paying particular attention to the 2023 IIT Report from the OPCW. As will be shown, this latest report represents yet another attempt by this international body to cover up the truth of what happened in Douma.

Introduction

On 23 January 2023, the OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) issued its report concerning the alleged chemical weapons attack of 7 April 2018 in Douma, Syria. It concluded there were ‘reasonable grounds’ to attribute responsibility to the Syrian Arab Republic (1). The Report came after five years of international controversy which included the emergence of whistleblowers from within the OPCW who identified serious procedural and scientific flaws with respect to its Douma Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) (2&3). Although the OPCW’s IIT report gives the impression that the issues raised by the whistleblowers issues have been rebutted, it actually incorporates the anomalies they had identified. As we shall see, these unresolved anomalies mean that the IIT’s conclusion that there are ‘reasonable grounds’ the Syrian Arab Republic carried out the alleged attack is untenable.

As a consequence, the IIT Douma report is now the third in a row – the other two being the 2019 Final FFM Report and the 2018 Secretly Modified Interim Report (4) – that can be shown to be fundamentally flawed and misleading. In 2023, the Berlin Group 21 (BG21) – comprised of Hans von Sponeck (former Assistant UN Secretary General), José Bustani (First Director General of the OPCW), Professor Richard Falk (Emeritus Professor, Princeton) and the author – circulated a detailed review of the OPCW’s Douma investigation reports to OPCW states parties and key UN officials. This review is available here and, as noted in this earlier article, at a July UN Security Council meeting the Brazilian government asked the OPCW to respond to it. The OPCW has thus far failed to do so.

Drawing upon work conducted by the author for the BG21 review, this article identifies some of the major shortcomings in the IIT Douma Report and explains how they have been carried through from the earlier FFM Final Report. It does so in the following steps. First, some background is provided to the 2018 alleged Douma attack and the ensuing events before focusing on the four key areas -toxicology, witness testimony, chemistry and ballistics – in respect to which controversies emerged. Specifically, the major anomalies regarding the evidence from Douma, originally found by the Douma FFM team, are identified. These anomalies were clearly set out in the Original Interim Report (5), which was subsequently leaked to Wikileaks, and strongly suggested the attack had not occurred as alleged. I then discuss how the OPCW effectively censored these anomalies and how the IIT report continues to fail to address them. The article concludes with a discussion of the overall implications of these shortcomings for the official OPCW ‘reasonable grounds’ claim. Also noted are the implications of corrupted OPCW investigations for 1) international peace and security, 2) other reports and allegations regarding chemical weapons attacks in Syria and 3) the probable involvement of the British government with a war crime.

Background

According to the OPCW, the alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma involved the dropping of two yellow chlorine cylinders from Syrian government helicopters on to a residential area near Damascus. At one location, referred to as Location 4 in the OPCW reports, the cylinder apparently broke through a metal bar reinforced concrete ceiling, hit a floor, and then bounced sideways a further three meters across a bedroom to end up landing on a bed (see Images 1 and 2). No one was harmed at this location.

Image 1: Graphic showing images from Location 4 and the alleged trajectory of cylinder after it had penetrated the roof (5)

Image 2: The cylinder on the bed at Location 4 (6)

At another residential building, referred to as Location 2, a cylinder reportedly punched a hole in a metal rebar reinforced ceiling but failed to penetrate it (see Images 3 and 4).

Image 3: Location 2 and cylinder (7)

Image 4: Location 2 and cylinder

At this location, it is claimed that chlorine gas from the cylinder, which ended up poised over the hole it had just made, rapidly filled the building which reached, within minutes according to the OPCW’s IIT Report, a lethal concentration. As this was happening, according to the IIT, 43 civilians who had been sheltering in the basement of the building ran up and out onto the street – the basement could only be accessed via the street - and then back into the building to then run up the stairs and into the cloud of chlorine gas.

The IIT claims that the civilians then almost immediately became trapped and killed by chlorine gas. Photographs show the deceased gathered in piles and with no signs of either having tried to escape or otherwise protect themselves, thus suggesting they were immobilised and killed at a very rapid rate (see Image 5). Photographs and witnesses also indicated that some of the victims had a profuse discharge of a white foam-like material from their mouths and noses (see Images 6&7).

Image 5: Image uploaded to Internet by activists showing how civilian victims were found gathered in piles.

Images 6 & 7: Example of the profuse foamy discharge found on some of the victims and, in this case, apparently appearing after an earlier picture where no foam can be seen.

In fact, the IIT’s conclusion the deaths were caused by chlorine runs contrary to many official claims that were made at the time of the alleged attack which, because of the scenario - rapid collapse and death accompanied by foaming at the mouth - asserted that a fast-acting nerve agent (such as Sarin) had likely been used. For example, on 14 April, A US official was reported by CNN as stating:

“While the available information is much greater on the chlorine use, we do have            significant information that also points to sarin use," … "They do point to miosis -- constricted pupils -- convulsions and disruptions to central nervous systems. Those symptoms don't come from chlorine. They come from nerve agents. ... It's a much more efficient weapon, unfortunately, the way the regime has been using it, and it's resulted in higher deaths, it resulted in terrible pictures.” (emphasis added, 8)

At an emergency UNSC meeting held on 9 April, the French UN Representative stated that:

“… thousands of videos and photos emerging from Douma in recent days showed victims foaming at the mouth and convulsing, all symptoms of a potent nerve agent combined with chlorine. There was no doubt as to the perpetrators, as the Syrian Government and its allies alone had the capability of developing such substances.” (emphasis added, 9)

In the UK, expert Professor Alastair Hay said that the scene was ‘pretty much consistent with a nerve-agent-type exposure’ and that it was suggestive of something that was very toxic, and people have pretty much died where they were when they inhaled the agent. They’ve just dropped dead’ (10). As we shall see, serious questions were to emerge during the OPCW’s FFM investigation regarding the cause of death.

In contrast to the claims coming from Western governments and their allies, the Syrian government and the Russian Federation denied allegations the alleged attack had been carried out by the Syrian Air Force and accused opposition groups of staging the event. On 14 April 2018, the US, UK and France carried out retaliatory military strikes against the Syrian Arab Republic, before the OPCW FFM investigation had begun, and during which a number of locations, allegedly connected with a chemical weapons programme, were hit. According to the Pentagon, these sites were the Barzeh research facility and two sites at Him Shinsar near Homs (11). This action occurred without UNSC authorization and, with respect to the UK, in the absence of parliamentary authorization.

The Controversies

Dissent within the OPCW started during the preparation of the original FFM Douma report which had been drafted by Inspector Brendan Whelan following his deployment to Syria in 2018 (12). This report, referred to here as the Original Interim Report (13), presented the evidence found by the Douma team and, implicitly or explicitly, raised a series of anomalies regarding the following areas of inquiry:

(a) toxicology (analysis of if and how the victims came to be poisoned by chemicals)

(b) witness testimony (regarding the claims of victims, first responders and medical staff who witnessed events surrounding the alleged attack),

(c) chemical analysis (relating to the search for evidence of chemical release),

and;

(d) ballistics (concerning assessments of the cylinders purported to be the source of chemical release and how they arrived at their locations).

These anomalies, which cast serious doubt on whether the alleged attack had actually occurred, will be detailed later in this article.

Unknown to the Douma team, however, the Original Interim Report was modified by persons unknown and in a way that left the key anomalies raised in the Original Interim Report removed or obfuscated. Instead, the secretly modified draft, referred to here as the Secretly Redacted Interim Report, gave the strong impression that confirmation of the alleged chemical attack was only a matter of clarifying a few details (see Images 8 and 9). The British journalist Peter Hitchens reported extensively on this particular event in his article ‘Sexed Up for War’ (14).

Images 8 and 9: These exerts show the Original Interim Report conclusion (1.13-1.14), which made clear that it was not yet established whether or not an attack had occurred, and the contrasting Secretly Redacted Interim Report conclusion (8.3) which suggested that a chlorine gas attack had occurred.

Inspector Whelan only discovered the Original Interim Report had been modified by accident and, when he did, immediately protested to the OPCW’s Chief of Cabinet (see Image 10) (15).

Image 10: Opening paragraph of the ‘Grave Concern’ email sent from Inspector Whelan to Robert Fairweather, Chief of Cabinet, on the 22 of June 2018.

Although Whelan’s intervention prevented the publication of a seriously flawed and misleading report, it became apparent over the next few months that OPCW senior management intended to maintain tight control over the course of the investigation and report writing. For example, before an agreed Interim Report was published in July 2018, a US delegation, unknown to the investigation team and without prior notice, was allowed to brief them and promote their assessment that a chemical weapon, specifically chlorine, had been used by the Syrian government (16). In a BBC podcast entitled ‘Mayday’, an unidentified individual, allegedly from the OPCW, claimed that such meetings were normal (17). However, while a Member State may offer data or intelligence to the OPCW to help an investigation, a State Party seeking to influence the inspectors in this manner is arguably a violation of Article VIII (paragraph 47) of the CWC. This states that ‘[e]ach State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties’ (18).

More generally, as would be reported later by the whistleblowers (19), the team who had actually deployed to Syria were sidelined. When the FFM Final Report was eventually published in March 2019, it concluded there were ‘reasonable grounds’ the alleged attack had occurred. At the time, it was an OPCW inspector not involved in the Douma FFM who provided the official briefing on the report, whilst a request from the Russian Federation to allow all of the FFM team to provide a briefing on the investigation was voted down by the OPCW Executive Council (20).

Rather than resolving the anomalies raised in the Original Interim Report, which had effectively been censored through the debacle of the Secretly Redacted Interim Report, the Final FFM Report presented a flawed and inadequate assessment of key areas of evidence relating to the toxicology, witness testimony, chemical analysis and ballistics. In the following months, but to no avail, the whistleblowers raised the alarm with senior OPCW management that something had gone very wrong with the investigation (21). In May of 2019, an executive summary of an Engineering Assessment regarding the two gas cylinders was leaked and published online by the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media (22). The report concluded that the cylinders had been placed by hand and not dropped from a helicopter.

Later that year, at an event arranged under the auspices of the Courage Foundation, an OPCW official with knowledge of the Douma investigation presented evidence to a panel of experts, which included first OPCW DG José Bustani (23), about the Douma investigation. A statement from the Panel, together with the key analytical issues, was published by the Courage Foundation. In their ‘Analytical Points’ the panel stated:

“A critical analysis of the final report of the Douma investigation left the panel in little doubt that conclusions drawn from each of the key evidentiary pillars of the investigation (chemical analysis, toxicology, ballistics and witness testimony,) are flawed and bear little relation to the facts” (24). 

In their Statement the panel reported that:

“Based on the whistleblower’s extensive presentation, including internal emails, text exchanges and suppressed draft reports, we are unanimous in expressing our alarm over unacceptable practices in the investigation of the alleged chemical attack in Douma, near the Syrian capital of Damascus on 7 April 2018.  We became convinced by the testimony that key information about chemical analyses, toxicology consultations, ballistics studies, and witness testimonies was suppressed, ostensibly to favor a preordained conclusion” (25).

Shortly after this panel the Original Interim Report and other documents were published by Wikileaks.

So, what exactly were the anomalies originally found by the Douma FFM team which, suppressed and unresolved by the OPCW, led to these critical assessments regarding the scientific rigour and accuracy of the investigation in relation to toxicology, witness testimony, chemical analysis and ballistics? And how does the IIT Report perpetuate rather than resolve them?

Toxicology: How could 40 or more civilians have collapsed and died immediately due to chlorine gas whilst exhibiting profuse discharge of foam?

As noted earlier, it was widely suggested at the time of the alleged attack that the scenes and symptoms at Location 2 indicated the use of a powerful fast acting nerve agent such as Sarin. However, when the lab results came back in May 2018 they showed no evidence of nerve agents. As a result, the FFM team were faced with trying to understand how the 43 civilians at Location 2 were killed by chlorine gas, the only other toxic chemical plausibly present. The censored Original Interim Report had in fact identified key anomalies which led to the conclusion that chlorine gas from the cylinder on the roof was not the cause.

Specifically, it was noted that the rapid death of civilians who were close to cleaner air and escape, coupled with profuse discharge of foam from the mouth and nose, were not consistent with poisoning by chlorine gas (see Images 5 and 6 above). If killed by chlorine gas damaging the victims’ lungs and leading, via a condition called pulmonary oedema, to the oral and nasal foamy discharge, some considerable length of time would have been necessary for this to occur during which there would have been time to escape. Consequently, the victims would not have collapsed on the spot, gathering in piles. If, alternatively, the victims were killed through, for example, asphyxiation via extremely high concentrations of chlorine gas, there would not have been time for the profuse discharge at the mouth and nose to have occurred. As such, the combination of rapid collapse and death accompanied by rapid foamy discharge were incongruent with chlorine gas being the cause of death. In addition, the plausibility of the victims running into the building, supposedly full of chlorine gas, was questioned: ‘[i]t should be expected that on encountering the irritant gas, victims would instinctively have retreated and exited the building, which was within a few metres away’.

This finding had been supported by three German NATO specialists in chemical weapons toxicology/pharmacology whom the FFM investigators had travelled to meet in early June 2018. This key finding was clearly articulated in the Original Interim Report:  

“A highly debilitating agent, in the opinion of the FFM team, would have to have been released in order to cause the rapid onset of symptoms described by witnesses and observed in the videos where large numbers of decedents are concentrated in different apartments at Location 2. The rapid onset of heavy salivation and frothing from the mouth would be more consistent with exposure to a highly toxic nerve agent than a chocking (sic) agent such as chlorine or phosgene. However, analytical results showed no indication of organophosphorus nerve agents or their degradation products present in samples collected at the scene of the alleged attack or in biomedical samples from victims” (26).

And:

“The rapid, and in some reported cases, immediate onset of frothing described by victims is not considered consistent with exposure to chlorine-based choking or blood agents. The opinion of a number of toxicologists, specialists in chemical-weapons-related intoxication supported this assessment” (27).

When the attempt was made to substitute the Original Interim Report with the Secretly Redacted Interim Report, this critical information was completely removed (28). Come the Final FFM Report, the original unequivocal ruling out of chlorine gas was replaced with an ambiguous statement saying that ’it is not currently possible to precisely link the cause of the signs and symptoms to a specific chemical’ (29). The formulation of words used avoids making any explicit statement ruling out chlorine, thus leaving the possibility that chlorine might have been a cause. No explanation or justification for this expunging of an unequivocal expert opinion from the German toxicologists was ever given. Whilst the report did refer to later consultations with toxicologists in September and October 2018, it provided no information about what they said that might help to explain or justify the omission. Also, the Final Report made no mention of the original consultation with the German toxicologists; the only consultations shown in the report timeline were those obtained during the Autumn of 2018 (30).

Questions were also raised with respect to the authenticity of the foam-like material observed on some of the victims. The Final FFM Report actually noted that ‘[m]any of the victims present with white, foam-like oral and nasal secretions, similar in appearance to fulminate pulmonary oedema but in multiple cases much more profound and seemingly persistent’ (31). It also noted that ‘[w]hen comparing adult and paediatric groups, there does not appear to be any correlation in secretion presence, absence or amount’ (32). In paragraph 8.98, the Final Report states that:

“The airways secretions seen in many cases are similar to those seen with exposure to some chemical weapons, toxic industrial chemicals and toxic does of pharmaceutical agents but are more profound and seem to have a consistency more like viscous foam than secretions typically originating from the upper or lower airways. Notably, there are casualties both with and without secretions that are in very close proximity to one another (33). 

Strikingly, in one film a boy with profuse foaming from the mouth can be seen being moved a day after the alleged attack and here the foam-like material has clearly persisted and is semi-rigid (see Images 8 and 9 and film here at time 1.13-1.36).

Images 8 & 9: Two stills from film uploaded by activists showing rigid foam protruding from victims mouth and nose the following day.

The alarming possibility raised here is that at least some of the foam discharge seen on the deceased was artificial, added in order possibly to create the impression a nerve agent attack had occurred.

No serious exploration of these observed anomalies was ever carried out. In fact, when Inspector Brendan Whelan sought to engage a forensic pathologist with respect to other inexplicable observations -strange discolouration around the eyes of the victims and wet hair - he was blocked from doing so.

The IIT Deception: Making Up the Science

There is little doubt that the IIT would have been fully aware that the original toxicology assessment, verified by the German NATO specialists, had to be addressed in some way. Explaining the deaths at Location 2 is a core component of establishing whether the alleged attack had occurred. The bottom line being, of course, that if the victims had not been killed by chlorine gas coming from the cylinder, but died some other way, then the alleged attack did not occur. The approach the IIT takes with its toxicology problem is remarkable and is based upon creating a demonstrably false understanding that the victims were trapped upstairs and killed by a very high concentration of chlorine gas.

The IIT report states that a single toxicologist consulted by it concluded that the ‘accounts of the victims and medical personnel are consistent with the rapid release of a high dosage of chlorine gas which led to the rapid and high fatality rate seen at Location 2’ (34). In doing so, it does not mention either the Final Report conclusion – that symptoms could not be linked to a specific chemical – or the Original Interim Report conclusion which had unequivocally ruled out chlorine gas. Furthermore, neither the IIT nor their toxicologist provide adequate explanations for either the trapping and rapid death of victims on the ground floor, or the combination of rapid death and profuse discharge of foam.

The IIT attempts to explain trapping and rapid death as follows. First, the report refers to having ‘obtained information indicating that the ‘concentration of chlorine released at Location 2 … was at least 1,000 ppm’ (35), a level that would cause death ‘within minutes’. No source is provided for this claim. Then, drawing upon its own gas dispersion models and without providing any analytical details thereof, the IIT claims that victims who had moved out of the basement and onto the first and second floors of the building to escape the chlorine gas were confronted with a scenario in which, within 3 minutes of gas release, ‘all floors within the building would have exceeded a concentration of chlorine which would lead to death’ (36). Regarding trapping, they claim that ‘the only possible escape route from the apartments via the stairwell’ was obstructed by the rapid dispersion of gas (37). They state that escape was impossible after 20 seconds on the third floor and impossible after 60 seconds on the second floor (38).

However, although creating the impression that they have explained how the victims became trapped upstairs to then die in minutes from extremely high levels of chlorine gas, the IIT’s analysis is profoundly deceptive. It notes that a specialist stated ‘all exit routes on the third and second floor were no longer accessible without exposure to a high and lethal volume of chlorine gas’ (39). But this, obviously, does not include the first floor. The IIT then immediately goes on to state this scenario was ‘consistent with the rapid onset of symptoms which led to the fatalities recorded on stairs and landings, as reported by witnesses and observed in videos and pictures’ (emphasis added)’ (40). However, this statement is highly misleading because 16 victims were also photographed in an apartment – not stairs or landings - on the first floor and who were therefore, according to their specialist’s assessment, not prevented from escaping.

In fact, when the IIT uses the term ‘first floor’ they are actually referring to the 'ground floor. The diagram below (Image 10) shows the layout from the FFM Final Report and which refers to the ‘first floor’ as the ground floor.

Image 10: Diagram presented in Original Interim Report (p. 14) and Final FFM Report (para 8.27; p. 16)

As can be seen in this diagram, for the sixteen victims photographed on the ground floor (labelled the ‘first floor’ by the IIT), it was literally only a few steps through the bottom of the stairwell and out the front door – a scenario in which the victims could hold their breath for the few seconds it would take them to run through any lethal gas to get to safety. In short, these sixteen individuals did not have to escape “via the stairwell”, in the sense of running down flights of stairs, and so their exit route would not have been “obstructed” by any lethal levels of chlorine.

Also, the IIT’s explanation does not account for four decedents photographed on the street outside the building (see Image 10 above) who, obviously, could not have been trapped in the way described by the IIT. In fact, and conveniently for the IIT, these four decedents are not mentioned anywhere in its report. In short, the IIT Report misleads the reader into thinking that the victims were trapped up stairs when, in fact, the majority were found either outside or on the ground floor and within seconds of escape.

Not only is failure to escape from the ground/first floor left unexplained, it is also unclear from the IIT’s analysis what the actual gas concentration is supposed to have been on the ground floor level. Elsewhere in the IIT report a concentration gradient is described – “dropping from the highest levels in the room directly under the cylinder … to the lowest levels on the street” (41) and which was consistent with “two gas dispersion models” (42). If the 1000 ppm level to which the IIT refers occurred just below the cylinder, what was the concentration then on the ground floor? The IIT does not tell us. As noted above, we are told that escape routes on the second and third floor were no longer accessible due to high and lethal levels of chlorine gas but this tells us nothing about the first floor/ground floor. And the IIT’s statement - that within three minutes of release ‘a concentration of chlorine which would lead to occupant death’ (emphasis added) was present on all floors – does not actually differentiate between rapidly lethal levels and levels that cause death over a much longer period (hours or days). The lack of clarity and specificity on this issue amounts to obfuscation on the part of the IIT.

In addition to this misleading analysis regarding gas concentration and trapping of victims, the rapid and profuse discharge of foam accompanied by rapid death is not explained. The IIT report does include a single statement apparently explaining foaming although not its rapid and profuse discharge alongside rapid death: The IIT Report states that it (not the toxicologist) ‘notes that as chlorine gas reacts with the cells and moisture in the gastrointestinal tract to produce acids, that reaction also leads to the oral and nasal secretion of a foam-like substance …’ (43). The single academic source cited for this claim does not, however, make any such statement, referring only to acid production (44), whilst the 269-page US Department of Health document – Toxicological Profile for Chlorine – also cited in the IIT Report makes no mention of any such a phenomenon (45). Contrary to the IIT’s assertion, neither of these sources describe rapid and profuse discharge of foam from the nose or mouth alongside rapid death.

Elsewhere, in support of the claim that symptoms were compatible with chlorine gas, a misleading citation is given. The citation, provided in footnote 28 (46), is as follows: “DOA 1933 Pathology of Chlorine exposure leading to death. “Postmortem findings included […] mottled appearance on lung surface with scattered areas of emphysema, plural hemorrhage, perivascular edema, […] frothy fluid filling the trachea and bronchi”. This citation omits the fact that the actual publication states ‘pathology of chlorine exposure leading to death in 24 hours’ (emphasis added) (47). As such the edited citation is misleading because it creates the impression that the material supports the idea of rapid foaming and death within minutes when, in fact, it does not.

Summing up, the IIT’s analysis suggesting victims were trapped by lethal levels of gas is seriously flawed and misleading. It gives the impression that all the victims were trapped upstairs when, in fact, the majority were found on the ground floor (with a further four actually outside on the street) and who were within seconds of escape. None of these victims could have been killed in the way described by the IIT and for it to suggest otherwise is, to put it bluntly, an act of deception. When attempting to deal with the anomalies originally identified in the Original Interim Report, regarding rapid collapse and death combined with rapid and profuse foam discharge, the IIT resorts to making false claims involving demonstrably false scientific references. These false references are presumably designed to mislead the reader into thinking the rapid appearance of foam discharge from the mouth and nose alongside rapid death is a recognized or even explicable symptom of chlorine gas poisoning when, in fact, it is not.

Witness Testimony: Why were there widely diverging accounts of what happened in Douma as well as significant anomalies?

A total of 39 witnesses were interviewed during the course of the Douma FFM investigation. Of these, 13 were interviewed in Damascus and had been provided by the Syrian authorities whilst the remaining 26 were interviewed in Turkey (‘Country X’ in OPCW reports) and who were generally either members of the White Helmets (first responder organisation set up by the former British military office James le Mesurier) or were brought to the inspectors by the White Helmets. The FFM team returned on two occasions to conduct further interviews, in May and October 2018 (48), and on both occasions it was witnesses in Turkey who were interviewed.

There were important differences and anomalies with respect to witness testimony. As is now known from the Original Interim Report, ‘[t]wo broad and distinct narratives were derived from discussions with interviewees, one corresponding to the group interviewed in Turkey and the other to the group interviewed in Damascus’ (49). Those interviewed in Turkey supported the narrative that there had been a chemical attack. On the other hand, those interviewed in Damascus reported seeing no evidence of a chemical attack. Come the Final FFM Report, however, and without any explanation as to why, the version of events presented by the Turkey-based witnesses was accepted as accurate whilst that of the Damascus based witnesses was either rejected or sidelined.

For example, throughout the Final FFM Report there is a subtle but persistent downgrading of the Damascus-based witnesses. According to the Original Interim Report:

‘Most of the medical staff present in the emergency department on the 7 April, who were interviewed, emphasised that the symptoms of the casualties were not consistent with those expected from a chemical attack.’ (50)

In the Final FFM Report, however, doubts about their presence at the hospital scene are expressed.

‘A number of the interviewed medical staff who were purportedly [emphasis added] present in the emergency department on 7 April emphasised that the presentation of the casualties was not consistent with that expected from a chemical attack’ (51)

There is no explanation why a lower level of confidence (or changing the quantification of the number of medical staff from ‘most’ to ‘a number’) has been applied. By doing so, these witnesses’ testimonies are placed under question. Adding the qualifier ‘purportedly’ suggests these witnesses were not present at the hospital.

A connected issue here concerns claims that the hospital scenes associated with the alleged attack had been entirely staged. In April 2018, the Russian Federation brought 17 witnesses to The Hague and, on 26 April, held a briefing at the OPCW headquarters. Immediately following this they held a press conference during which it was claimed no chemical attack had occurred and that the hospital scenes were not authentic (52). Also, and quite remarkably,  just prior to the Final FFM Report being published, BBC Producer Riam Dalati had stated over social media that ‘the ATTACK DID HAPPEN’, but without specifying whether or not he believed it was a chemical attack; And that ‘[a]fter almost 6 months of investigations, I can prove without a doubt that the Douma Hospital scene was staged. No fatalities occurred in the hospital. All the #WH [White Helmets], activists and people I spoke to are either in #Idlib or #EuphratesShield areas. Only one person was in Damascus’ (53).

In the Final FFM Report, however, testimony regarding the staging of the hospital scenes was downgraded by treating it as ‘open-source video material’ (54) which meant it could not fully contribute to the body of material that the FFM relied upon to reach its conclusions (55). The Final FFM Report also obscured the fact that the witnesses had actually appeared in a briefing at the OPCW headquarters by referencing only the press conference held after the briefing (56).

Of equal importance was the existence of significant anomalies associated with the Turkey-based witnesses. First, whilst the Damascus-based witnesses reported symptoms consistent with dust inhalation, the Turkey-based witnesses reported, in some cases, symptoms commensurate with nerve-agent poisoning including profuse foaming from the mouth and constricted pupils (miosis) (57). Hallucination, which is not associated with chlorine poisoning, was also reported.

All of these these important differences and anomalies were obscured in the Final FFM Report with ‘Turkey’ and ‘Damascus’ groups being blended together (58), the technical term miosis replacing reference to ‘constricted pupils’ (59), and hallucination no longer being mentioned.

Another major anomaly concerned some Turkey-based witness accounts claiming deceased were found in the basement at Location 2, as well as basements across the area and far to the south. These reports were anomalous because it was unclear how victims could have been killed in the basement at Location 2 by gas from a cylinder that had landed on a balcony four floors above. As noted earlier, there was no apparent access to the basement from inside the building. Hence for the purported gas to have reached the basement from the top balcony, it would have to have funneled down the stairwell, out onto the street, then re-entered the basement of the building from outside. The gas concentration therefore could never have been higher in the basement than it was in the street because of the physical laws of gases (60). And, obviously, it was even less clear how people could have been killed in basements away from Location 2 where any gas concentration levels would have been even lower.

The issues of bodies in multiple basements was obscured and confused in the Final FFM Report: Whilst it referred to some witnesses ‘seeing decedents in the basement of the building’ (61), at another point it avoids any mention of deceased in the basement at Location 2 and instead refers to bodies found in other basements and across a wide area: ‘Witness accounts place the deceased lying on the stairs, inside apartments on multiple levels of Location 2, inside basements of neighbouring buildings across the area, on rooftops and on the streets’ (62). No explanation or rationale is provided as to how the chlorine gas could have possibly killed people over such a wide area, as claimed by these witnesses.

The IIT Deception: Memory Holing Inconvenient Witness Testimony

Come the IIT Report the existence of contrasting and anomalous witness testimony, already sidelined and downplayed in the Final FFM Report, is almost completely erased. There is no explicit mention of the narrative originally presented by the Damascus witnesses and, instead, it largely relays the narrative given by the Turkey group witnesses. As with the Final FFM Report, no explanations or rationalizations are given that justify the corroboration of the Turkey group witnesses and rejection of the Damascus group. Anomalies regarding reported symptoms are dealt with by giving the misleading impression that miosis – constricted pupils – is compatible with chlorine gas poisoning (63). Also, although claiming that it considered allegations of staging at the hospital (Location 1), there is no further mention or analysis of this anywhere in the report.

Regarding the anomalous claims concerning deceased in the basement at Location 2, the description of the gas dispersion studies (64) makes no reference to how lethal levels of chlorine could have developed there which, as described in the Original Interim Report, was not directly connected to the stairwell and was accessible only from the street. As already noted when discussing toxicology, the lethal concentration of gas claim by the IIT also does not explain the four deceased photographed outside the building on the street. In fact, all of the anomalous witness claims regarding dead and injured in basements and across the area south of Location 2 are absent from the IIT Report.

Overall, then, anomalous witness reports of deaths that cannot be explained by the IIT have been removed and without any explanation or justification. The IIT Report glosses over obvious anomalies such as witness claims indicating no attack had occurred and completely sidesteps the issue of the allegations regarding the staging of the hospital scenes at Location 1. Instead, and entirely memory holing the Damascus witnesses, the IIT glibly states ‘[d]espite some minor variances in witnesses’ recollection of events, the IIT assessed the accounts, overall, to be consistent’ (65).

Such censorship by the IIT is explicable, of course, when one understands that these anomalies all point toward an alternative conclusion as to what happened in Douma as well as the likelihood of there having been incorrect and possibly falsified witness testimony which, in particular, suggested a sarin-like nerve agent attack had occurred with deaths across a wide area of Douma.

Chemical analysis: Exaggerating the evidence for chlorine gas release at Locations 2 and 4

From the very start of the Douma investigation the analysis of chemicals found at the scenes of the alleged attacks had been inconclusive. There was evidence that some kind of chlorine-based chemical, which could have easily been from household chlorine bleach or some other benign source, had been in contact with the samples collected. The Original Interim Report clearly and accurately stated that ‘[t]he actual chemical was not identified’ (66).

Moreover, the report stated that ‘[a]lthough the cylinders might have been the sources of the suspected chemical release, there is insufficient evidence to affirm this’ (67). As discussed earlier, these results had been dramatically manipulated back in 2018 when the Original Interim Report was altered to suggest a chlorine gas attack had occurred (see image 10).

Image 10: Secretly Redacted Interim Report (para 8.3) showing reversal of original finding to one claiming chlorine gas was likely released

Following discovery of this falsification by Inspector Whelan and his subsequent ‘Grave Concern’ email, the OPCW was forced to present a more accurate and objective claim in its Published Interim Report. Here, it was stated, without exaggeration, what had been found by the chemical analysis: ‘[v]arious chlorinated organic chemicals were found in samples from locations 2 and 4. These results are reported in Annex 3. Work by the team to establish the significance is ongoing’ (68).

In the Final Report, however, the unjustified highlighting of chlorine gas seen in the Secretly Redacted Interim Report was reinserted and strengthened further with the claim that chlorine gas had likely been used as a weapon: it states there are ‘reasonable grounds that the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon took place. This toxic chemical contained reactive chlorine. The toxic chemical was likely molecular chlorine.’ (69)’. As documented at length in the BG21 Review, a combination of ‘omission, fabrication and fallacious reasoning’ was used in order to obfuscate the simple scientific fact that no chemical analysis had been able to confirm the presence of chlorine gas (See Annex Three, BG21 Review, pages 101-117). In short, the FFM Final Report was making exaggerated claims unsupported by the evidence (70).

The IIT Deception: Creating New Claims of Evidence for Chlorine Gas Release, based yet again on false and misleading claims

The IIT report states that it undertook a number of steps to clarify and deepen its understanding of the findings by the FFM that reactive chlorine was used as a weapon (71). This ‘deepening’ involved further analysis of the FFM findings by a single chemist in combination with two ‘supplementary samples’, one of which was passed by a ‘third party at Location 2 in Douma on 8 April 2018’ (72). The chemist was also ‘asked to give particular consideration to the hypothesis that household bleach products’ could have been the source of the chemical results (73).

Despite giving the appearance of having found powerful new confirmatory evidence of chlorine gas release, however, several issues are immediately obvious (see also Aaron Maté’s detailed paper here). First, significant analytical weight is placed on the presence of a chemical called TeCP (Tetrachlorophenol), which had been found in a concrete sample supplied by the unnamed third party. The IIT Report boldly claims that ‘the presence of TeCP clearly points to chlorine gas as being the chlorinating agent present at the scene, and in very high concentrations’ (74).

The IIT Report goes on to state that samples taken from the street at the entrance to Location 2 did not show TeCP and the other highly chlorinated phenol TCP (Trichlorophenol). This, the IIT claims, is consistent with chlorine gas being released from the cylinder because one would expect highly chlorinated phenols to be detected close to the cylinder, where concentrations are highest, and not detected further away where concentrations would be lower: ‘This [the claim that the cylinder was the source] is indicated by the presence of highly chlorinated phenols TCP and TeCP at the sampling locations close to the cylinder (i.e. at the crater on the roof and in the room under the cylinder), as opposed to the least chlorinated phenols MCP and DCP on the street far away from the cylinder’ (75).

However, two issues immediately stand out here. First, examination of the Final Report chemical analysis results tables shows that TeCP was also identified in samples from the tunnel leading to the hospital at Location 1, a site which is even further away from the cylinder at Location 2 than the two samples showing no TeCP/TCP and where there was no suggestion of there being high concentrations of chlorine gas. This inconsistency, which obviously undermines their argument about TeCP being a smoking gun with respect to chlorine gas release, is unexplained in the IIT Report. Second, the concrete sample presented by a third party has actually been used to replace the FFM’s own sample of concrete collected from the exact same location (in the room below the cylinder): this can be seen in the sample table of the Final Report. Why the IIT analysed this sample of concrete rather than their own sample of concrete is unexplained in the IIT report thus begging the question of whether it had been tampered with.

Another notable example of problematic analysis in the IIT Report include its discussion of wood samples. Here it misleadingly claims that the fact that ‘[c]hlorine gas is on the only chemical that, alone, would produce both BC (Bornyl Chloride) and TCP in conifer wood’ (76) is ‘strong evidence of the presence of chlorine gas in the building’ (77). This claim is based entirely on an unwarranted assumption that BC and TCP were produced simultaneously, from a single source, and at the time of the alleged attack. Importantly, as pointed out by Inspector Whelan, TCP is frequently found in the environment and, as such, the assumption now made by the IIT is not warranted (78). 

Finally, the IIT makes great play of claiming to have evaluated alternative scenarios, and yet completely ignores direct evidence of staging. Specifically, at Location 4 the highest readings of the chemical chloride were found on a pair of gloves found in the corner of the room. These gloves were covered in a liquid that was also observed to be present on surfaces around the room (79). The obvious possibility that the gloves were worn by an individual who was spreading a chemical around the room simply passes by the IIT team.

In sum, the IIT perpetuates the attempts made in the earlier FFM reports to exaggerate the strength of evidence regarding the release of chlorine gas at both locations. As such, the combination of ‘omission, fabrication and fallacious reasoning’ (BG21 Review) is carried through to the IIT Report (80).

Ballistics and Engineering: How could the two cylinders have caused so much damage whilst remaining relatively unscathed?

Regarding the two yellow cylinders photographed at Locations 2 and 4 (see Images 1-4 above and Images 11 and 12 below), the primary concerns raised in the Original Interim Report related to the compatibility between the damage observed on the cylinders and that observed at the two locations and, in view of the observed damage, whether it was plausible that the cylinders had in fact been dropped from a height (i.e. from a helicopter).

Specifically, the key issue related to the remarkable lack of observable damage to the cylinders given their alleged role in, at Location 2, punching a hole in a metal bar reinforced concrete ceiling, and, at Location 4, breaking through a metal bar reinforced ceiling. For example, the cylinder on the bed at Location 4 (see Image 11) is claimed to have completely punched through the metal bar reinforced ceiling, and yet large protruding fins remain largely intact.

Image 11: Cylinder on bed at Location 4 (Final Report Annex 7 p. 61).

And graphic showing the hole allegedly created by the cylinder at Location 4.

Image 12: Cylinder on balcony at Location 2 (Final Report Annex 6 p. 54).

At Location 2, metal bars have been snapped and some deflected through more than 90 degrees thus indicating a powerful and explosive impact (see Image 13). Meanwhile, the cylinder alleged to have caused this damage shows minimal damage (see Image 14).

Image 13: Location 2 hole in ceiling showing severe damage to the ceiling including some metal bars deflected through more than 90 degrees. (Original Interim Report: Annex 6: p. 54 and Final Report Annex 6: p. 54).

Image 14: Location 2 cylinder head (Original Interim Report: Annex 6; p. 53 and Final Report Annex 6 p. 53).

In particular, the cylinder head at Location 2 had actually been addressed in the engineering study, leaked in 2019, and its computer analysis results, which predicted significant and obvious indentations on the cylinder head (See Image 15).

Image 15: Computer simulation images taken from leaked engineering report. (81)

In the FFM Final Report this issue, however, was obfuscated because the images presented from their computer simulations actually obscure the cylinder head for Location 2 (see Image 16 below) and the cylinder at Location 4 (see image 17 below), making it impossible to discern the simulated interaction between the metal bars and the cylinders.

Image 16: Modulation of Cylinder Impact on Balcony (Final FFM Report: Annex 6; p. 57)

Image 17: (Final Report: figure 10, p. 18)

More generally, instead of detail and explication, the Final FFM Report simply asserts that the damage was compatible. This assertion is made across just eleven 11 paragraphs (82) and with two of these (83) each being repeated twice. 

It is likely that, in fact, the FFM’s computer analyses could not replicate the minimal damage seen on the cylinder head at Location 2 and, instead, showed something closer to what was found in the leaked engineering study analysis. Their only option then was to effectively avoid presenting the results by offering indistinct images from their computer simulations from which it is impossible to discern the interactions between the cylinders and the metal bar reinforced ceilings.

A second key issue concerned the way in which the cylinder at Location 4 had apparently bounced off the floor and moved 3 metres sideways across the room to land on top of a bed. The Original Interim Report had clearly identified serious doubts about the plausibility of this scenario (84) whilst the Final FFM Report offered a demonstrably incomplete explanation about how the cylinder might have maintained enough momentum to perform the bounce and subsequent flight across the room (see Image 18 below).

Image 18. Final FFM Report: para 8.34, p. 19.

No attempt is made in this diagram to explain how the cylinder was able to alter direction, generating a lateral component of velocity, and then move 3 meters across the bedroom. In other words, the graph does not explain how the cylinder came to change direction.

The IIT Deception: Avoiding the Impact Damage Issue and Introducing an Implausible New Theory to explain the bouncing cylinder

The IIT report spends 61 pages (nearly half the report) discussing various aspects related to the two yellow cylinders (85). It states that two experts were asked to evaluate whether the cylinders were placed by hand or dropped from a great height (i.e. by helicopter) (86) and that ‘the experts were tasked with assessing whether the observed damage at both locations would match the damage one could expect from the cylinders’ impact … [and] … consider other plausible methods of delivery, potentially constitutive of the “staging” scenario’ (87). The IIT Report confirms that it builds upon the analysis provided in the FFM Final Report (88). It also claims that computer simulations were performed in order to ‘further understand the observed impact phenomena at both locations’ (89). The IIT also claims to have ‘thoroughly reviewed’ the leaked engineering assessment and its finding that cylinders were most likely placed by hand (90). All of these claims, however, are highly misleading.   

Nowhere in the IIT Report is there any attempt to demonstrate the supposed damage caused to the two cylinders as a result of their impacting metal bar reinforced ceilings. Instead, the compatibility is simply asserted: ‘The IIT notes that the damage observed on both cylinders is consistent with an impact following their drop from a considerable altitude’ (91). This omission is made even more remarkable because of its claim to have ruled out the possibility the cylinders were placed by hand. The results of impact studies showing the predicted deformation of the cylinders following impact with the metal bar reinforced ceilings would be central to establishing whether the cylinders had been dropped from a helicopter or were placed by hand. The IIT Report does not provide these impact study results and provides no explanation for this critical omission. As such, the fundamental issue of the compatibility, or lack thereof, between the damage observed on the cylinders and the damage to the ceilings is avoided entirely.

Regarding the attempts to explain the bouncing cylinder at Location 4, the erroneous graph and analysis presented in the Final Report is referenced in the IIT Report as evidence for the cylinder bounce (92). The IIT report then adds that ‘it is conceivable that, after impact, the projectile may have rotated in a vertical plane and bounced off the floor’ (93). The the graphic provided by the IIT is shown below in Image 19 below.

Image 19: Scenario to explain bouncing cylinder in the IIT Report: p. 99.

It is unclear from this presentation how the cylinder could have bounced in such a manner without the protruding fins being completely flattened. The theorized scenario is, therefore, implausible.

The IIT Report then proceeds to pose new speculative theories without logical explanation, calculations or modelling and then offers muddled and contradictory final sentences:

‘It is likely that the impact also induced a rotation around the cylinder length axis, which may explain why it moved diagonally across the room. The location in which the cylinder was found is as unlikely as any other location within the room. Moreover, the location in which the cylinder was inspected by the FFM 18 days after the incident does not have a bearing on the cylinder’s content and design’ (94).

The second sentence misleadingly suggests that the cylinder could have ended up anywhere in the room, thus implying there is no rational or scientific assessment that can be made about the trajectory of the cylinder. In other words its motion was entirely random and unpredictable. The second sentence suggests that the time of inspection is not relevant to the content or design of the cylinder. There are two levels of obfuscation here: first, no one is debating the issue of the cylinder’s design or content, but rather its apparent trajectory across the room. Second, the date of inspection is irrelevant given that the cylinder was photographed on the bed shortly after the alleged attack.

In conclusion, the central scientific question of the predicted damage to the cylinders that would result from their impacting metal bar reinforced ceilings is consistently avoided by the OPCW. To be clear, this is a smoking gun issue: if it cannot be shown that the damage to the cylinders is compatible with the damage to the ceilings, then there are no grounds for concluding the cylinders were dropped by Syrian Air Force Helicopters. The only other possibility is that they were placed there by hand, as part of a staged chemical weapons attack. Instead of presenting the evidence to prove their case, the OPCW obfuscates and avoids. The FFM Final Report, to all intents and purposes, offers blurred images from their computer simulations from which it is impossible to see the predicted damage. The IIT Report, whilst giving the impression it has comprehensively dealt with the cylinder issue, actually makes no attempt at all to analyse the interaction between the cylinders and the ceilings.

Conclusions

The unresolved anomalies, obfuscated in the Final FFM Report and avoided entirely by the IIT Report, are fundamental to the tenability of the OPCW’s claim that there are ‘reasonable grounds’ the alleged attack occurred in Douma. If the circumstances surrounding the deaths at Location 2 are not consistent with chlorine gas, contradicting and anomalous witness testimony has been censored without explanation, flawed chemical analysis has been used to suggest the likelihood of chlorine gas release, and there has been no attempt to demonstrate that the cylinders were the cause of the holes in the ceilings, then there are no objective grounds for concluding the alleged attack occurred.

Moreover, it is inconceivable that the OPCW’s IIT were not fully aware of these issues, given the high profile controversy, emergence of whistle blowers, leaked documents and the like. The fact that the original anomalies and issues have been avoided and left unresolved in the IIT Report can only be because the IIT cannot resolve them. To do otherwise would involve admitting the civilians were not killed by chlorine gas at location two, that the marginalised Damascus-based witnesses were likely telling the truth whilst the Turkey-based witnesses were telling inconsistent stories suggesting a nerve agent (sarin-like) chemical attack across a wide area of Douma, that there was no hard evidence even of chlorine gas release, and that the cylinders could not have been dropped from a helicopter.

The implications are extensive. Clearly backed into a corner by the emergence of whistleblowers and leaks, the OPCW’s IIT has resorted to increasingly extreme and, to the careful reader, obvious deceptions. That this has been allowed to happen demonstrates quite how far the OPCW has been subverted, in this case serving the geo-political interests of those countries -US, UK and France - who had immediately bombed Syria in response to the alleged attack and, therefore, needed a clear attribution of responsibility so as to retrospectively justify their military action. The OPCW is supposed to be a gold standard UN-linked organisation committed to high scientific standards and rigorously independent: the evidence from the Douma investigation shows that, at least in the realm of the Syrian chemical weapons issue, this is not the case. The greatest danger here is that the OPCW can be used as a trigger for war, rather than contributing toward peace and disarmament. Powerful states accusing their enemies of using prohibited weapons can then claim a casus belli for war, once a corrupted OPCW investigation has rubber stamped an allegation of a chemical attack.

Of equal significance is what this means for all the other FFM and IIT reports which, much to the satisfaction of the US and UK, paint a picture of systematic use by the Syrian government of chemical weapons. Now that the Douma FFM Final Report and the IIT Report have been shown to be fraudulent -unscientific and plagued with errors- what does this mean for all of the other allegations and reports? Put simply, if Douma was a staged attack, effectively covered up by the OPCW, then there is a very real and logical possibility that all of the alleged chemical attacks have been staged. In other words, in the case of the Syrian war, we may have been witnessing a strategic deception aimed at delegitimating the Syrian government in the eyes of the world whilst a regime-change war has been fought. Is Syria a case of Iraqi WMD 2.0? Probably.

Finally, for the British government, the events in Douma present disturbing possibilities. The 43 dead civilians found at Location 2 were not, as we have seen, killed by chorine gas at that location. Where they died, and how, is yet to be established. What we do know is that the extremist opposition group Jaish al-Islam were in control of Douma at the time of the alleged attack, that they held large numbers of civilians captive in underground prisons, and that they had a long track record of human rights violations and various atrocities. They were also de facto allies of the British government. Furthermore, it was the late James le Mesurier, the former British military officer and head of the white helmets first responder organisation in Syria, who helped arrange the Turkey-based witness for the OPCW FFM. Whatever happened to these civilians, the British government and those linked to it had close proximity to the events. If they were murdered for the purposes of a staged chemical weapons attack, then the British government would be complicit in a war crime.

Footnotes

(1) IIT Report: Note by the Technical Secretariat: Third Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Persuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapon Use” Douma (Syrian Arab Republic) – 7 April 2018. Available at https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2023/01/s-2125-2023%28e%29.pdf. Accessed 1 February 2023.

(2) Final FFM Report: ‘Report of the Fact-Finding Mission Regarding the Incident of Alleged use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2019’, S/1731/2019, OPCW, 1 March 2019. Available at https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/03/s-1731-2019%28e%29.pdf. Accessed 19 October 2022.

(3) Secretly Modified Interim Report available at: https://wikileaks.org/opcw-douma/document/RedactedInterimReport/. See also Courage Foundation Panel, 15 October 2019, Courage Foundation, Available at https://berlingroup21.org/courage-foundation-panel-statement-october-2019. Accessed 7 February 2022. Accessed 18 April 2022 and Statement of Concern, 11 March 2021. BerlinGroup21, Available at www.BerlinGroup21.org. Accessed 27 February 2022

(4) ‘Sexed up to Make War – an astonishing leak from the Poison Gas Watchdog the OPCW’ by Peter Hitchens, Mail on Sunday, 24 November 2019. Available at https://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2019/11/new-sexed-up-dossier-furore-explosive-leaked-email-claims-that-un-watchdogs-report-into-alleged-poison-gas-attack-by-assad-w.html.

(5) Original Interim Report: Annex 7: p. 58 (available at: https://wikileaks.org/opcw-douma/document/FirstdraftInterimReport/)and Final FFM Report: Annex 7: p. 61.

(6) Final FFM Report: Annex 7 p. 61.

(7) Original Interim Report: Annex 6; p. 54 and Final Report: Annex 6 p. 54.  

(8) Biological samples from Syria attack site test positive for chlorine and nerve agent, official says’, Ryan Browne, Nick Paton Walsh and Barbara Starr, CNN, 13 April 2018. Available at  https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/13/politics/syria-chemical-attack/index.html. Accessed 9 February 2022.

(9) United Nations press release: Security Council 8225^th Meeting (PM), 9^th April 2018. ‘In Emergency Meeting, Security Council Speakers Voice Grave Concern over Alleged Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, as Versions of Recent Attacks Sharply Differ’, United Nations, Available at   https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13284.doc.htm. Accessed 9 February 2022. See also; ‘US officials confident chlorine and sarin used in Syria attack’ by Elizabeth Landers, CNN 14 April 2018. Available at https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/14/politics/us-chlorine-sarin-syria/index.html. Accessed 9 February 2018; 'Instead of breathing the air, we breathed the smell of blood': Syrian girl seen in harrowing hospital video after chemical attack tells how she survived when a 'barrel' dropped’ by Iain Burns and Vanessa Allan, Daily Mail, 16 April 2018. Available at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5620439/Syrian-girl-seen-harrowing-hospital-video-chemical-attack-tells-survived.html. Accessed 9 February 2022.

(10) ‘Nerve Gas Used in Syria Attack, Leaving Victims “Foaming at the Mouth”, Evidence Suggests’ by Liz Sly, Susan Haidamous, Washington Post, 11 April 2018.  Available at https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/nerve-gas-used-in-syria-attack-leaving-victims-foaming-at-the-mouth-evidence-suggests-1835759; accessed 26 February 2023.

(11) Pentagon Briefing on Syria Strikes with Dana White and Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie, 14 April 2018. C-Span, Available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?444082-1/pentagon-briefs-reporters-syria-airstrikes. Accessed 14 February 2018.

(12) Whelan had an extensive role in the Douma FFM which included oversight of scientific planning, analysis of data gathered during the investigation, and involvement with a toxicological assessment. He was responsible for the keeping of records of discussions, writing progress reports and updates for the Office of the Director General, as well as being chief drafter of the first FFM report on Douma.

(13) Original Interim Report: ‘Report on the Progress of the Fact-Finding Mission Regarding the Incident of Alleged Use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018.’ Available at Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/opcw-douma/document/FirstdraftInterimReport/. Accessed 19 October 2022. 

(14) ‘Sexed up to Make War – an astonishing leak from the Poison Gas Watchdog the OPCW’ by Peter Hitchens, Mail on Sunday, 24 November 2019. Available at https://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2019/11/new-sexed-up-dossier-furore-explosive-leaked-email-claims-that-un-watchdogs-report-into-alleged-poison-gas-attack-by-assad-w.html.

(15) ‘Grave Concerns’ email sent by Brendan Whelan, 22 June 2018. Available at https://berlingroup21.org/grave-concerns-email-june-2018 and at https://wikileaks.org/opcw-douma/#Internal%20OPCW%20E-Mail.

(16) ‘The OPCW and Douma: Chemical Weapons Watchdog Accused of Evidence-Tampering by Its Own Inspectors’ by Jonathan Steele, Counterpunch, 15 November 2019, Available at https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/11/15/the-opcw-and-douma-chemical-weapons-watchdog-accused-of-evidence-tampering-by-its-own-inspectors/. Accessed 18 April 2022.

(17) ‘Mayday’, BBC. ‘Extra Episode: The Canister on the Bed’, Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p08z33bp. Accessed 1 September 2022.

(18) Article VIII, Chemical Weapons Convention. Available at https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-viii-organization, accessed 23 September 2022.

(19) Inspector Brendan Whelan’s 25 April 2019 Letter to DG. Available at https://berlingroup21.org/letter-to-opcw-director-general-march-2019.

(20) Netherlands OPCW Delegation; social media

https://twitter.com/NLatOPCW/status/1106239319029833729

. Accessed 9 February 2022.

(21) Inspector Ian Henderson’s 14 March 2019 memo to DG. Available at https://wikileaks.org/opcw-douma/document/DG-memo1/page-1/#pagination, downloaded 4 July 2022. 

(22) 'Assessment by the engineering sub-team of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission investigating the alleged chemical attacks in Douma in April 2018’, Working Group on Syria, Propagana and Media. Available at https://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/assessment-by-the-engineering-sub-team-of-the-opcw-fact-finding-mission-investigating-the-alleged-chemical-attack-in-douma-in-april-2018, accessed 24 September 2022.

(23) Courage Foundation Panel members: José Bustani, first Director General of the OPCW; Professor Richard Falk (Princeton), Kristinn Hrafnsson (Wikileaks), John Holmes (Maj Gen [retd], Dr Helmut Lohrer (Board member International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War [IPPNW]; Professor Dr Guenter Meyer (University of Mainz); Elizabeth Murray (former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, National Intelligence (retd).

(24) ‘Analytical Points: OPCW Panel’, Courage Foundation, 23 October 2019. Available at https://www.couragefound.org/2019/10/analytical-points-opcw-panel/ and https://berlingroup21.org/courage-foundation-panel-analytical-points-october-2019. Accessed 7 February 2022.

(25) ‘Panel Criticizes “Unacceptable Practices” in the OPCW’s investigation of the Alleged Chemical Attack in Douma, Syria on April 7^th 2018, Courage Foundation. Available at available at https://www.couragefound.org/2019/10/opcw-panel-statement/ and https://berlingroup21.org/courage-foundation-panel-statement-october-2019. Accessed 7 February 2022.

(26) Original Interim Report: ‘Report on the Progress of the Fact-Finding Mission Regarding the Incident of Alleged Use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018.’ Available at Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/opcw-douma/document/FirstdraftInterimReport/. Accessed 19 October 2022: para 7.81; p. 26. 

(27) Ibid: para 7.82; pp. 26- 27.

(28) See Inspector Whelan’s ‘Grave Concern’ email ‘Grave Concerns’ 22 June 2018. Available at

https://berlingroup21.org/grave-concerns-email-june-2018 and also the Redacted Interim Report available at: https://wikileaks.org/opcw-douma/document/RedactedInterimReport/.

(29) Final FFM Report: ‘Report of the Fact-Finding Mission Regarding the Incident of Alleged use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2019’, S/1731/2019, OPCW, 1 March 2019. Available at https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/03/s-1731-2019%28e%29.pdf. Accessed 19 October 2022: para 2.11; p. 4. See also Inspector Whelan’s Letter to Director General, April 2019. Available at https://berlingroup21.org/letter-to-opcw-director-general-march-2019.

(30) Final FFM Report: Annex 3; p. 41.

(31) Final FFM Report: para 8.90; p. 28.

(32) Final FFM Report: para 8.70; p. 28.

(33) Final FFM Report: para 8.98; p. 29. 

(34) IIT Report: para. 6.108, p. 44.

(35) IIT Report: para. 6.107; p. 44.

(36) IIT Report: para 6.111; p. 44.

(37) IIT Report: para 6.112: p. 44.

(38) IIT Report: para 6.112: p. 44-45.

(39) Emphasis added, IIT Report: para 6.112; p. 45.

(40) IIT Report: para 6.112; p. 45.

(41) IIT Report: para. 6.86.

(42) IIT Report: para. 6.71.

(43) IIT Report: para 6.106; p. 43.

(44) See page 257: ’since chlorine gas is moderately water soluble, it can form hypochlorous acid and hydrochloric acid as it dissolves into airway liquid surface when contacting mucosal surfaces and airways’, C. W. White and J. G. Martin (2010), “Chlorine Gas Inhalation Human Clinical Evidence of Toxicity and Experience in Animal Models”, in Proc Am Thorac Soc, Vol. 7 (4), (July 2010), pp. 257-263. Available at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20601629/. Accessed 1 February 2023.

(45) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Toxicological Profile for Chlorine, Available at https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp172.pdf, accessed 1 February 2023.

(46) IIT Report: p. 44.

(47) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Toxicological Profile for Chlorine, Available at https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp172.pdf, accessed 1 February 2023.

(48) Final FFM Report: Annex 3; pp. 40-41.

(49) Original Interim Report: para 7.40; p. 20.

(50) Original Interim Report: para 7.52; p. 21.

(51) Final FFM Report: para 8.54; p. 23.

(52) Reuters, (2018, April 26). Russia presents unharmed Syrians to OPCW, Western envoys condemn “stunt”. Retrieved July 5, 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-chemicalweapons-idUSKBN1HX27P.

(53) Riam Dalati (BBC Producer) social media: https://twitter.com/Dalatrm/status/1095677403198906369?s=20&t=3_vddh4hE6hg4rXsWvA1ww. Accessed 9 February 2022.

(54) Final FFM Report. Note 13 p. 22.

(55) Final FFM Report, para 7.5, p. 9.

(56) Final FFM Report: Annex 2; p. 34, second bullet point).

(57) Original Interim Report: para 7.60; pp. 22 and para 7.77; p. 26.

(58) Final FFM Report, para 8.79; p. 26.

(59) Final FFM Report, para 8.80; p. 27.

(60) Original Interim Report: para. 7.25; p. 15.

(61) Final FFM Report: para 2.10 p. 3 and para 9.5; p. 30.

(62) Final FFM Report: para 8.62; p. 24.

(63) IIT Report: para 6.118; p. 46.

(64) IIT Report: paras 6.109-6.114.

(65) IIT Report: para 6.105; p. 43.

(66) Original Interim Report: para 1.6; p. 2. See also paras 7.14; p. 12 and 8.2; p. 30.

(67) Original Interim Report: para 1.7; p. 3. and para 8.3; p. 30. 

(68) Published Interim Report: para 2.5; p. 3 and para 8.7 p.10.

(69) Final FFM Report, emphasis added, para 2.17; p. 4 and para 9.12; pp 31-32.

(70) Berlin Group 21 Review, Appendix 3. See also ‘Analytical Points’. Courage Foundation Panel. Available at https://berlingroup21.org/courage-foundation-panel-analytical-points-october-2019. Accessed 28 April 2022.

(71) IIT Report: para 6.36; p. 26.

(72) IIT Report: paras 6.43-6.44: p. 29.

(73) IIT Report: para 6.47;. p. 139.

(74) IIT Report: para 6.52; p. 30.

(75) IIT Report: para 6.57; p.32.

(76) IIT Report: para 6.60; pp. 32-33.

(77) IIT Report: para 6.68; p. 36.

(78) Inspector Brendan Whelan’s 25 April letter to DG. Available at https://berlingroup21.org/letter-to-opcw-director-general-march-2019.

(79) Reference is made to a viscous liquid that was found on gloves at the entrance to and inside the room at Location 4: ‘The FFM team observed a viscous liquid throughout the room, which was not apparent in videos. The same liquid was observed also before the entrance to the apartment and on disposable gloves present at the location (Annex 5)’ (Final Report: Annex 7; p. 63). Analysis showed that the level of chloride detected on these gloves was far higher (in fact the highest level of chloride detected in any sample) than that detected on any of the cylinders (Final Report: Annex 5: entry 25).

(80) Berlin Group 21 Review; p. 53.

(81) Working Group on Syria, Media and Propaganda, http://syriapropagandamedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Engineering-assessment-of-two-cylinders-observed-at-the-Douma-incident-27-February-2019-1.pdf. Accessed 8 March 2023.

(82) Final FFM Report paras 2.13-2.15, p. 4; paras 8.29-8.31, p. 17; paras 8.34-8.35, pp. 19-20 and paras 9.8-9.10, p. 31.

(83) Final FFM Report: para 8.31, p.17; para 9.9, p. 31 and para 8.34, p. 19; para 9.10, p. 31.

(84) Original Interim Report, para 7.32; p. 18.

(85) IIT Report: paras 6.21; pp. 47-108.

(86) IIT Report: para 6.197: p. 74.

(87) IIT Report: para 6.198; p. 75.

(88) IIT Report: para 6.199; p. 75.

(89) IIT Report: para 6.213; p. 81.

(90) IIR Report: paras 6.286-6.301; pp. 96-102.

(91) IIT Report: para 6.182; p. 70.

(92) IIT Report: para: 6.292; p. 98.

(93) IIT Report para 6.294: p. 98.

(94) IIT Report: para 6.298; p. 100.